Minimal inference: An inquiry into Navya-Nyāya in quest of nonhuman logic

Abstract

Philosophical inquiry has historically centered on human experiences, including cognition. This focus has often led to the assumption that language, specifically human adult language (hL), is a prerequisite for complex reasoning. However, growing evidence suggests that non-human animals (NHAs) and non-linguistic humans exhibit significant inferential abilities, challenging this assumption. This paper explores the implications of these findings by examining the concept of ‘minimal inference’—reasoning that may occur independently of hL. It argues that a critical re-evaluation of the relationship between language and thought is necessary. The paper employs a multidisciplinary approach, combining philosophical analysis with insights from the South Asian Nyāya tradition. While Navya-Nyāya philosophy, with its emphasis on human experience and language, might initially seem anthropocentric, its focus on ‘relational logic’ and the primacy of perception offers a framework for understanding non-human cognition. By expanding Navya-Nyāya in this direction and examining its technicalities through the lens of contemporary research on NHAs’ cognition, this paper aims to contribute to a broader understanding of inference, exploring the possibility of non-linguistic or differently linguistic forms of reasoning. This includes investigating the role of counterfactuality, perception-based concepts, and the potential existence of a ‘minimal grammar’ in NHAs’ cognition.