

ARABIC REASON(S) IN LATIN HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. AVICENNAN PROOFS FOR THE IMMATERIALITY OF INTELLECT IN ALBERT THE GREAT'S PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS

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Abstract: Albert the Great makes wide use of Arabic scientific and philosophical sources, in both his autonomous theological works and his commentaries on Aristotle's *corpus*. This contribution aims to explore a set of ten Arabic arguments for the incorporeal nature of the human rational soul that Albert quotes *in extenso* in at least four important works of his: i) *De homine* (written around 1242), ii) *De anima* (1254–7), iii) *De natura et origine animae* (post 1254–7), and iv) the second, possibly inauthentic part of *Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei* (post 1274). While alternatively attributed by Albert to both Avicenna and Algazel or to the sole Avicenna, the ten proofs constitute in fact a largely *verbatim* quotation of a lengthy excerpt of the psychological section of al-Ġazālī's *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* [*The Intentions of the Philosophers*] (Latin *Summa theoricæ philosophiæ*). In tracing the variations and additions provided by Albert with respect to al-Ġazālī's text, and the specific role played by the proofs in their new Albertinian contexts, this contribution will add some fresh material to the well-known historical transmission of Arabic psychology to Latin Scholasticism.

Keywords: Immateriality; Intellect; Proofs of incorporeality; Rational soul; al-Ġazālī; Avicenna; Albert the Great.

Introduction

Albert the Great's imposing philosophical psychology is entrusted to a series of works pertaining to different literary genres: commentaries on Aristotle's relevant works, autonomous treatises on crucial issues of psychology and noetics, and theological writings discussing anthropology. To the first category belong the pivotal paraphrase of *De anima*¹ and the exegesis of the so-called *Parva naturalia*;² to the second, independent works envisaged to fill some perceived gaps

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1 ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1968.

2 See ALBERTUS MAGNUS 2017 (*De nutrimento et nutrito, De sensu et sensato cum De memoria et*

in Aristotle's *corpus* such as *De intellectu et intelligibili*³ and *De natura et origine animae*;⁴ to the third category, finally, both early works, such as the section *De homine* of the *Summa de creaturis*,⁵ and very late, possibly pseudepigraphic writings like the *Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei*.⁶ Within such variety of works, specific source-materials were often reused by Albert in different contexts, with a greater or lesser degree of adaptation to their immediate surroundings.

This article will examine one such case of prolonged usage of materials throughout Albert's production, focusing on a set of (around) ten arguments for the incorporeal nature of the human rational soul that Albert quotes *in extenso* in at least four important works of his: i) *De homine* (written around 1242), ii) *De anima* (1254–7), iii) *De natura et origine animae* (post 1254–7), and iv) the

reminiscentia); ALBERTUS MAGNUS *De somno et vigilia*; ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1890 (*De spiritu et respiratione*, 213–255; *De iuventute et senectute*, 305–321; *De morte et vita*, 345–373). For *De somno et vigilia*, a by all means crucial text in the series, see also the German translation of book III by Silvia Donati in ALBERTUS MAGNUS 2020, and her interpretive essay on the Arabic sources of the work (DONATI 2018). For a wider aperçu on the tradition and challenges of the *Parva naturalia* in the Middle Ages as a supplement of the core of philosophical psychology represented by Aristotle's *De anima* see also the collective volume BYDÉN, RADOVIC 2018.

3 The critical edition of the treatise in the *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia* (Editio Coloniensis) is currently being prepared by Silvia Donati and is available online in ALBERTUS MAGNUS *De intellectu*. For the treatise and its place in Albert's Peripatetic science of the soul cf. at least DONATI 2019, who, in her opening remarks, aptly stresses *inter alia* the role of *De intellectu* as a supplement to Aristotle's transmitted works, in keeping with the method of explanation-cum-addition of Aristotle envisaged at the very beginning of Albert's commentary on the *Physics*, I.1.1 (ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1987, 1.36–41: "Taliter autem procedendo libros perficiemus eodem numero et nominibus, quibus fecit libros suos Aristoteles. Et adde-mus etiam alicubi partes librorum imperfectas et alicubi libros intermissos vel omissos, quos vel Aristoteles non fecit vel forte si fecit, ad nos non pervenerunt").

4 ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1955; see also the German translation in ALBERTUS MAGNUS 2006. Anzulewicz's *Einleitung* to the latter work, together with Geyer's *Prolegomena* to the 1955 edition and with Anzulewicz's introduction to the *Liber de principiis motus processivi* (in ALBERTUS MAGNUS 2014), is fundamental for framing the work within Albert's overall project of natural philosophy, between psychology proper, metaphysics, and zoology. For a thorough analysis of this momentous philosophical and cultural project, and Albert's zeal to fill the perceived gaps of Aristotle's *corpus*, see DONATI 2011.

5 ALBERTUS MAGNUS 2008.

6 On the *Summa theologiae* and the discussed authenticity of its second part see at least WIELOCKX 1990; ANZULEWICZ 1999, 10; and, most recently, the contributions on the work gathered in the 2023 issue of the *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale*, which tackle various historical and doctrinal aspects of the *Summa* and globally provide new light on its disputed authorship.

second, possibly inauthentic part of *Summa theologiae* (post 1274). While alternatively attributed by Albert to both Avicenna and Algazel or credited to the sole Avicenna, the ten proofs constitute in fact a largely *verbatim* quotation of a lengthy excerpt of the psychological section of al-Ġazālī's *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* [*The Intentions of the Philosophers*] (Latin *Summa theoricæ philosophiæ*, henceforth *STP*), which is based in turn, admittedly, on Avicennan materials.⁷

Arabic Sources for the Immateriality of the Soul

Albert's reliance on the Arabic-speaking theologian Abū Ḥāmid al-Ġazālī (Latin Algazel, d. 1111) for this issue is not accidental. From the point of view of Albert's reception of Arabic authors, it fits well into the overall picture that has emerged from the systematic study of all the explicit quotations of Algazel in Albert's oeuvre, which I have conducted in a previous study.⁸ Albert quotes Algazel, whom he sees as a faithful follower (*sequax*) and an abridger (*abbreviator*) of Avicenna, more than three hundred times, throughout his entire career.⁹ All three main sections of Algazel's *STP* – *Logic*, *Metaphysics*, and *Physics* – are repeatedly quoted by Albert at various junctures of his works and for an extremely wide variety of purposes.¹⁰ What is more, Algazel is sometimes concealed under the name of Avicenna, his venerated master in Albert's somewhat blurred picture of the history of philosophy.¹¹ Albert, that is, sometimes quotes

7 For the Arabic text of the *Maqāṣid* see AL-ĠAZĀLĪ 1961, AL-ĠAZĀLĪ 2000, and AL-ĠAZĀLĪ 2008: 9–222; for the Latin text of the *STP* see the edition of *Metaphysica* and *Physica* by MUCKLE 1933 and of the *Logica* by LOHR 1965. A critical edition of the sole fourth treatise of the *Physica*, devoted to psychology, has been published by ST. CLAIR 2005. For the dependence of the *Maqāṣid* on a Persian text by Avicenna see *infra* and fn. 15. The relevant passage for us is taken from al-Ġazālī's *Physics*, treatise IV, section 3 (*On the human soul*): see AL-ĠAZĀLĪ 1961, 362.23–368.22; MUCKLE 1933, 175.29–180.32, which corresponds to ST. CLAIR 2005, 76.376–82.525.

8 SIGNORI 2019, completed by SIGNORI 2020.

9 See SIGNORI 2019, 489–496 (with Table 1) for a conspectus of Albert's usage of Algazel throughout his career; SIGNORI 2019, 499–505 (and esp. Table 3) for the terminology of followership and abridgment with which Albert characterises Algazel's relation to Avicenna.

10 SIGNORI 2019, 521–526.

11 The real doctrinal relationship between Ibn Sīnā and al-Ġazālī is far more complex and nuanced than it emerges from Albert's understanding of it, and is still a matter of discussion among scholars. See e.g. GRIFFEL 2004, GRIFFEL 2009, GRIFFEL 2021, JANSSENS 2003, JANSSENS 2014, JANSSENS 2019, RUDOLPH 2005, SHIHADDEH 2005, and SHIHADDEH 2011 for some

the words (or doctrines) of Algazel under the name of Avicenna – a situation usually acknowledged in the *apparatus fontium* of Albert’s works with the formula “immo: Algazel.”¹²

From the point of view of doctrines and their history, moreover, al-Ġazālī’s *Maqāṣid* – and its Latin translation, the *STP* – constitute indeed an important vehicle for the transmission of the standard set of proofs for the immaterial nature of the soul given by Avicenna at various places in his oeuvre, and throughout his philosophical career.¹³ Most notably for our present purposes, the same proofs are also presented in the second chapter of the fifth treatise of Avicenna’s *De anima* – the *Kitāb al-Nafs* [*Book of the Soul*] of his major encyclopaedia, the *Kitāb al-Šifā’* [*Book of the Healing/Cure*] –, also known in Latin (with its ordinal number in the series of Avicenna’s books on natural philosophy) as *Liber sextus naturalium* (or *de naturalibus*).¹⁴ Al-Ġazālī, however, took the set of proofs he expounds not from the *Kitāb al-Šifā’*, but rather from a Persian work of Avicenna unknown to Latin Europe, the *Dānešnāme-ye ‘Alā ī* [*Book of Science for ‘Alā al-Dawla*].¹⁵ Pe-

recent orientation in the extremely rich debate. For Albert’s history of philosophy see at least SANTINELLO 1990.

- 12 SIGNORI 2019, 500. For examples see Albert’s reworking of Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, edited with the title of *Super Porphyrium de V universalibus* in ALBERTUS MAGNUS 2004, 38.15 (*app. fontium ad loc.*); *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1993(2), 86.55.
- 13 The proofs, although with a varying degree of expansion and emphasis put on the single arguments, appear in many works by Avicenna: (1) *K. al-Nafs ‘alā l-iḥtišār*, chapter 9, ed. LANDAUER 1876, 365.5–370.2 (German translation at 411–415) = ed. IBN SĪNĀ 1952(1), 172–175; (2) *Aḥwāl al-nafs*, chapter 5, ed. IBN SĪNĀ 1952(1), 80–86 and chapter 7, ed. IBN SĪNĀ 1952, 90–95; (3) *Risāla Adḥawīyya fī l-ma’ād*, ed. IBN SĪNĀ 1969, 174–183; (4) *K. al-Šifā’*, *K. al-Nafs* V.2, ed. IBN SĪNĀ 1959, 209–221; (5) *K. al-Nağāt*, *K. al-Nafs*, ed. IBN SĪNĀ 1985, 356.8–371.11; (6) *Dānešnāme-ye ‘Alā ī*, ed. IBN SĪNĀ 1952(5), 110–122.2. For an early recognition of the existence of a standard set of Avicennan proofs for the immateriality of intellect (and thus also of the structural homology between some of the texts here listed) see the passing remark by MARMURA 1991, 341. For chapter V.2 of the *Nafs* of the *K. al-Šifā’* in its Latin reception, with particular reference to Albert himself, see HASSE 2000, esp. 294–296. I plan to further explore this highly interesting complex of texts, together with their reprises in al-Ġazālī, in a future contribution more focused on Arabic material.
- 14 See IBN SĪNĀ 1959 for the Arabic text; IBN SĪNĀ 1968 (books IV–V) and VAN RIET 1972 (books I–III) for the Latin version (see IBN SĪNĀ 1968, 81–101 for chapter V.2).
- 15 See the Persian editions of the various sections in IBN SĪNĀ 1952(3) (*Logic* [*Manṭiq*]); IBN SĪNĀ 1952(2) (*Metaphysics* [*Ilāhiyyāt*]); IBN SĪNĀ 1952(5) (*Natural Philosophy* [*Tabī’iyyāt*]); IBN SĪNĀ 1952(4) (*Mathematics* [*Riyādiyyāt*]; *non vidi*) and the reprint of the previous edition by IBN SĪNĀ 1981. A valuable complete translation in a modern Western language is ACHE-NA-MASSÉ 1955–1958 (French); partial, often unreliable English translations are available in IBN SĪNĀ 1971 (*Logic*); IBN SĪNĀ 1973 (*Metaphysics*); JAUHARI 1988 (part of the *Physics*); a

culiar under many respects, Avicenna’s Persian *summa* proves unique also in its arrangement of this series of arguments. First, it elaborates a lot more than customary on the arguments based on the comparison between intellect and the organic faculties of the sensible soul (external and internal senses); second, it alters Avicenna’s usual order of presentation of the proofs, introducing the stronger, standard arguments for the immateriality of the soul after the somewhat weaker arguments based on the dissimilarity between intellection and organic cognition. Contemporary scholarship on Avicenna’s *K. al-Nafs*, as a matter of fact, recognises five main proofs for the immaterial character of the soul given in chapter V.2, subdividing them into three actual “demonstrations” and two “corollaries.”¹⁶ While this fivefold articulation of the chapter is certainly sound, the text arguably allows for a finer division too, which can result in a higher number of proofs.¹⁷ While the three demonstrations are maintained in the *DN* and the *MF*, the two corollaries of *Nafs* are expanded in a more comprehensive list of seven “signs” or “marks” [*alamāt*] of the soul’s immateriality in both Avicenna’s Persian *summa* and in its Arabic rendition by al-Ġazālī.

If one takes the perspective of Latin readers, then, two sets of ‘Avicennan’ proofs for the incorporeal nature of the soul were available: the shorter list of five arguments provided by Avicenna himself in *De anima* V.2, and the longer list of ten (or eleven) proofs offered by Algazel – the ‘follower’ of Avicenna – in his *STP, Physica* IV.3. While shorter, the list of *De anima* V.2 entailed a much higher degree of elaboration of the single arguments than the longer list of *Physica* IV.3. Apart from length and doctrinal expansion, further differences are detectable between Avicenna’s and Algazel’s treatments of the topic. First of all, as mentioned, the arrangement of materials is different, so that the proper apodictic demonstrations are postponed by Algazel while being brought to the forefront by Avicenna. A second, more formal difference is that Algazel takes

recent, complete Turkish translation is in IBN SĪNĀ 2013. For the dependence of al-Ġazālī’s *Maqāṣid* on the *Dānešnāme* see at least JANSSENS 1986; for the specific arguments we are dealing with, see also JANSSENS 2019, 118.

16 ALPINA 2021, 83–85.

17 For example, by separating the anti-atomistic arguments given in IBN SĪNĀ 1968, 82.88–85.34 (which are rightly seen by Alpina as part of the first demonstration) from the following reasoning, or by isolating the sub-argument given at IBN SĪNĀ 1968, 89.96–89.8 from its surroundings (as an instance of the “affinity argument,” for which see *infra*, fn. 25).

care of numbering each proof consecutively (*primum, secundum, etc.*, also mirrored in the original Arabic), while Avicenna's train of thought is only subdivided by less obvious catchwords, such as *item, alia demonstratio*, and the like.¹⁸ It goes thus to Albert's great merit as a scholar to have clearly acknowledged the philosophical equivalence of the two series of proofs, referencing indifferently Avicenna and al-Ġazālī as their author.

Concretely, however, it is clear from Albert's texts on the topic that he is indeed directly quoting al-Ġazālī's list, rather than Avicenna's one. While Avicenna is explicitly mentioned by name in all four texts by Albert we are considering, as opposed to al-Ġazālī, who appears only in two (*De homine* and *De natura et origine animae*), the Ġazālīan provenance of Albert's remarks is confirmed by several formal features of Albert's inventories of proofs: i) the number itself of the arguments he distinguishes (always ten), which mirrors Algazel rather than Avicenna; ii) the formal aspect of the consecutive enumeration of proofs (which is missing in the sole *De natura et origine animae*), which allows for easier reference and which is present in the *STP*, but not in Avicenna's *De anima*; iii) the explicit distinction, taken from al-Ġazālī and adopted by Albert in both *De homine* and *De anima*, of seven non-apodictic "signs" [*signa*] from three actual "demonstrations" (*demonstrationes*, in *De homine*) or "causes" (*causae*, in *De anima*) of the immateriality of the soul. In *De homine*, the borrowing from Algazel is most explicit, because Albert quotes *verbatim* the distinction between the seven signs and the three apodictic demonstrations from Algazel's *STP*: "quarum septem sunt signa, tres autem sequentes sunt demonstrationes necessariae."¹⁹ Interestingly, the lexicon of "signs" [*alamāt, signa*] will accompany, albeit to

18 See, e.g., IBN SĪNĀ 1968, 90.9, 91.36, 92.41, 97.12 (cases of *item*); 93.60 (*dicemus igitur*); 89.96 (*alia demonstratione*).

19 Cf. ALGAZEL, *STP, Physica* IV.3, ed. MUCKLE 1933, 175.29–32 (= ST. CLAIR 2005, 76.376–379): "Quod autem absque corpore fiat apprehensio intelligibilis significatur decem rebus que sunt fortissima signa, quorum septem sunt signa que precedunt, et tria sunt probationes necessarie." Albert uses *demonstrationes* in lieu of *probationes* and omits "quae praecedunt," but adds "sequentes" ("which follow") to his mention of the "three demonstrations," thus effectively maintaining the Ġazālīan emphasis on the arrangement of the ten proofs. The original Arabic text differs in part from the Latin version: "Ten things [*umūr*] are signs that [*yadullu ʿalā*] the perception of the intellect is without a body. Seven are strong marks [*alamāt qawiya*], persuasive by virtue of their non-existence [in the case of the intellect], while three are decisive demonstrations [Arabic *barāhīn qāṭiʿa*]," AL-ĠAZĀLĪ 1961, 362.23–363.1, my translation.

a different degree, all the Albertinian texts on the topic. The texts of *De anima* and *Summa theologiae*, in which only Avicenna is mentioned, are thus to be seen as cases of the “immo: Algazel” strategy of quotation employed by Albert, although the *apparatus fontium* of the two editions does not recognise the situation as such.²⁰

Albert’s Four Presentations of the Set of Proofs

The four presentations of the set of arguments on the part of Albert are very far apart in time, from the juvenile *De homine* (1242) to the very late *Pars secunda* of the *Summa theologiae* (after 1274). Nonetheless, all four show overall a remarkable degree of similarity, which suggests that Albert reused in his later works, at least in part, materials he had gathered for his previous ones. The general structure of the four sections that Albert devotes to the topic are synoptically compared in the following Table 1. The subsequent Table 2 aims to give a general overview of the actual doctrinal content of the proofs presented by Albert, by comparing them with their main direct source, al-Ġazālī’s *MF/STP*.

Table 1. General comparison of Albert’s four presentations of the Avicennan-Ġazālīan proofs for the immateriality of the soul

	<i>De homine</i>	<i>De anima</i>	<i>De natura et origine animae</i>	<i>Summa theologiae</i>
Section	⟨De natura animae rationalis⟩, 1, ALBERTUS MAGNUS 2008, 461–464	III.2.14, ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1968, 196–198	II.2, ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1955, 20–21	II.13.77, m. V, ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1895, 104–106
Date	1242	1254–1257	after 1254–1257	after 1274

²⁰ As to the *Summa theologiae*, Borgnet’s cross-reference to Albert’s *In II Sent.*, dist. XIX, art. 1 (suggested in ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1895, 103) does not seem *ad rem*, because that passage of the commentary on Peter Lombard discusses the immortality, rather than specifically the immateriality, of the human soul (see ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1894, 328–330). As far as the corresponding chapter from Albert’s *De anima* is concerned, Stroick only references Avicennan passages as parallels, with no mention of al-Ġazālī.

	<i>De homine</i>	<i>De anima</i>	<i>De natura et origine animae</i>	<i>Summa theologiae</i>
Genre	Theological work	Aristotelian paraphrase	Autonomous treatise on psychology	Theological work
Title of the chapter	<i>Utrum ipsa sit virtus corporea, an non</i>	<i>Et est digressio ostendens per decem probationes, quod intellectus est separatus et immixtus</i>	<i>De separatione animae rationalis a corpore secundum probationes Avicennae et Algazelis</i>	<i>Utrum anima separabilis sit a corpore, vel non, ita quod per se maneat separata, et agat secundum intellectum?</i>
Number of proofs	10	10	10	10
Numbering	yes	yes	no	yes
Attribution	Avicenna and Algazel	Avicenna	Avicenna and Algazel	Peripatetic thinkers, Avicenna
Qualification of the type of argument	“Arguments” [rationes]; seven “signs” [signa] and three “demonstrations” [demonstrationes]	Seven “signs” [signa] and three “causes” [causae]	“Proofs” [probationes] + “sign” [signum] (in one case)	Ten “signs” [signa]
Further notable features	<i>Quaestio</i> -form	Tight connection with Aristotle’s <i>Urtext</i> (cross-references)	Emphasis on the notion of <i>harmonia</i> ; in general less close to the source	Absence of Albert’s added argument based on brain anatomy

Table 2. Comparison of the proofs for the immateriality of the soul in al-Ġazālī's *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* (Ġ-MF) and Albert the Great's *De homine* (A-DH), *De anima* (A-DA), *De natura et origine animae* (A-DNO), and *Summa theologiae* (A-ST)²¹

Ġ-MF	A-DH	A-DA	A-DNO	A-ST	Description
1	1	1	1	1	Every corporeal faculty is harmed when its organ is harmed.
2+4	2	2	2	2	No corporeal faculty perceives its organ [Ġ-MF2] or itself [Ġ-MF4].
3	3	3	~3	3	Corporeal faculties only perceive by dissimilarity.
4		4		4 ²²	No corporeal faculty perceives itself.
5+6 ²³	5	5	4	5	Corporeal faculties are harmed by too intense perceptions.
			5		Every corporeal faculty is educed from the potency of matter by generation.
	6	6	7		Human beings share their brain anatomy with at least some wild animals devoid of intellect.
7	7	7	6	6	Corporeal faculties weaken with age.
8	8	8			Body is divisible, as opposed to the indivisibility of intellectual knowledge.
9	9	9	8	7+~8	That which abstracts intelligible forms from their material appendages is itself immaterial.
10					The intellect perceives what its bodily instrument (heart or brain) perceives through a form different in number from that of the instrument itself, and residing in the intellect, without communication with the body
	10		~3+10	9	A faculty acting on both corporeal and incorporeal objects is <i>ipso facto</i> incorporeal.
11	~ 4	10		10	Only an incorporeal faculty can have infinite potential objects.

21 In the following Table, a sign of tilde (~) indicates imperfect correspondence; a sign of addition (+) represents merging of two proofs.

22 Or rather "acts by itself," in the specific formulation adopted in the *Summa theologiae*.

23 Al-Ġazālī's sixth proof highlights the sudden character of the perceptions that can potentially harm the organic faculties, while the fifth emphasises the intensity itself. The two arguments are thus particularly similar, and it makes good sense that Albert merges them in one proof only.

As can be easily seen from Table 2, the first three “signs” presented by Algazel are reused by Albert in a remarkably stable way throughout his works. To the list of ‘steady’ proofs one can further add the merging of the Ġazālīan proofs 5 and 6 (concerning the potential damage that particularly intense perceptions can cause to the organic faculties), always reported by Albert, as well as Ġazālīan proof 7, the last of the ‘organic’ proofs, which has to do with the deterioration of bodily faculties due to old age (as opposed to the alleged reinforcement of the intellect with aging and increased cognitive experience) and which is also present in all the Albertinian works here considered. However, Albert also appears to have added an entirely new ‘organic’ proof to the series he reproduces: this is the sixth proof in the order Albert adopts in *De homine* and *De anima*, and the seventh in *De natura et origine animae*. This addition, which has to do with brain anatomy, will be discussed in more detail at the end of this paper.²⁴ This important variation notwithstanding, it seems safe to state that the seven Ġazālīan signs based on the comparison of intellect and bodily faculties are reported by Albert more faithfully than the three apodictic “demonstrations,” which are by contrast more profoundly altered and reworked.

While an in-depth analysis of these three arguments and their minute variations in Albert’s oeuvre exceeds the scope of this paper, it is important to notice here three important features of the Dominican master’s reception of the Arabic demonstrations. Firstly, the Ġazālīan proof 9 – known in scholarship on Avicenna as an “affinity argument”²⁵ – seems to share the stability of the preceding organic signs, because, like many of them, it is reported by Albert throughout the considered *corpus*. Secondly, Albert appears to have used frequently the eleventh argument provided by Algazel, concerning the potential infinity of objects of intellect (as opposed to the finitude of any given bodily faculty). This argument is peculiar in that it seemingly exceeds the boundaries of the ten arguments that al-Ġazālī announces at the beginning,²⁶ but, this notwithstanding, is numbered consecutively in both the Arabic edition and at least some Latin

24 See *infra* in the discussion of *Summa theologiae*, point (4).

25 ADAMSON 2021, 375: “[...] philosophers in the Islamic world frequently had recourse to what I will call ‘affinity arguments,’ in which the nature of the knower is assumed to correspond to the nature of the known. Thus the incorporeality of the mind is established on the basis of the incorporeality of its object.”

26 See *supra*, fn. 19.

manuscripts.²⁷ Furthermore, while structurally belonging to the second series of arguments expounded by al-Ġazālī, *i.e.* to the proper ‘demonstrations’ of the incorporeality of the soul, it is labelled in the text with the word for ‘sign’ or ‘inferential proof’ [Arabic *dalīl*, Latin *significatio*]. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, Albert appears to have made direct use of the first demonstration provided by Algazel (the eighth argument overall) only in his *De homine* and *De anima*, while framing the argument differently in both *De natura et origine animae* and *Summa theologiae*. This circumstance is relevant because that demonstration, which argues for the incorporeality of intellect by showing that the indivisible intellectual knowledge cannot reside within a divisible body at all, is arguably the paramount proof of the soul’s immateriality for Avicenna, and the one to which he devotes the most attention throughout his works.²⁸

Notable Features of Albert’s Treatment of the Proofs

To comment more in detail on the structure and content of the proofs summarised in the previous Tables 1–2, I will present here some observations on the argumentative strategy employed by Albert with regard to the literary genre of the works in which the proofs occur, as well as to Albert’s Arabic sources.²⁹

(1) *De homine* is the first of Albert’s works in which the set of proofs appears, and is arguably also the first work chronologically in which Albert makes use of al-Ġazālī. This reliance is, from the very beginning, systematic and extremely abundant, as I have shown elsewhere.³⁰ In keeping with this general tendency of Albert’s to trust and repeat the formulations of the Peripatetic Algazel (especially in matters of natural philosophy), the presentation of the doctrines concerning the incorporeality of the soul in *De homine* is also very faithful to the

27 AL-ĠAZĀLĪ 1961, 368.17: *dalīl ḥādī ‘ašar* (“eleventh sign”). This is mirrored in the Latin text edited by MUCKLE 1933, 180.25, who has “significacio undecima.” This is also the reading of manuscripts APV and possibly N used by ST. CLAIR 2005 (see the *apparatus criticus* at 81.520), although her edited text omits the numbering (probably because of the programmatic announcement of only ten, and not eleven, proofs at the beginning of the section).

28 This is the case, most notably, in chapter V.2 of the *K. al-Nafs* of the *K. al-Šifā’*, in which the proof from indivisibility covers a substantial section of the discussion: IBN SĪNĀ 1959, 210.6–214.5 for the Arabic text; IBN SĪNĀ 1968, 82.98–89.95, and see also the discussion in ALPINA 2021, 83–84.

29 Compare the row *Further notable features* in the preceding Table 1.

30 SIGNORI 2019, 490–491.

STP. A noteworthy aspect of this early engagement with Arabic material is that the format of the *quaestio* adopted by Albert in *De homine* interacts profoundly, and structurally, with the original Ġazālīan source. Al-Ġazālī's own *Maqāṣid*, as a matter of fact, often presents objections (advanced in the text by a fictional interlocutor) to the theses just expounded, which are defended by answering the objections with apposite counterarguments.³¹

This method of organising the discussion is also employed in the section with which we are dealing now. After having presented the seven persuasive signs based on the behaviour of the organic faculties,³² and having drawn the conclusion that the intellect acts in the opposite way (*[h]oc autem totum fit e converso in virtute intelligibili*),³³ Algazel formulates indeed an objection to the effect that the intellect too might seem to be affected by certain weaknesses or harms of the body's temperament (*virtus etiam intelligibilis impeditur ab apprehendendo propter infirmitatem quae est in complexione corporis*).³⁴ He then proceeds to refute the objection, by explaining that the connection between bodily affections and intellectual deprivation is only apparent: on the one hand, the soul can get distracted by what happens to its own body and so retract from its purely intellectual activities; on the other hand, it can be conceded that the soul might use the body for some of its acts, but as soon as one purely incorporeal action is found, the soul itself will be proved to be likewise immaterial.

Interestingly enough, this structure is perfectly mirrored in the *quaestio*-format of Albert's reworking of the passage in his *De homine*. First of all, ten proofs (largely corresponding to Algazel's ones, albeit with some variations)³⁵ are expounded. Then, in the *Sed contra*, four objections are presented, three directed against the first, and one against the fifth, sign.³⁶ These objections, despite being

31 This strategy of argumentation ("if someone said... we would say/it should be said...") is characteristic of the theological tradition of Islamic *kalām*, and more particularly of the genre of refutation [*radd*]; scholars have discussed on its Greek or Syriac underpinnings (see for instance VAN ESS 1970, COOK 1980, BENEVICH 2015). It is also employed by Avicenna in his own writings, although perhaps less pervasively than by al-Ġazālī: see BERTOLACCI 2006, 240–245, and especially Table 8.

32 MUCKLE 1933, 175.33–177.21; ST. CLAIR 2005, 76.380–77.401.

33 MUCKLE 1933, 177.22–27; ST. CLAIR 2005, 77.401–406.

34 MUCKLE 1933, 177.28–29; ST. CLAIR 2005, 77.407–408.

35 ALBERTUS MAGNUS 2008, 461.11–463.13. See *supra*, Table 2, for a *conspectus*.

36 After a general formulation of the difficulty in objection 1, objections 2–4 are taken re-

taken from different (often Arabic, and often medical) sources, globally go in the same direction as the one of the fictional interlocutor of Algazel's *STP*. It is thus particularly relevant that, in the end, the solution offered by Albert evokes Avicenna and Algazel again, and even expounds *verbatim* one of the counter-arguments advanced in the *STP* to refute the objector's claim – specifically, the one concerning the distraction of the soul.³⁷ All in all, the material of the Arabic source is seamlessly integrated into the new Latin context of a theological *summa per quaestiones*, thanks precisely to the objection-*cum*-answer strategy of exposition already adopted by al-Ġazālī (and which derives in turn, ultimately, from Islamic theological models).

(2) The contextual situation changes rather drastically in *De anima*, the second text of Albert we are considering that deals with the Avicennan-Ġazālīan proofs. Being a paraphrase of an extant text by Aristotle, Albert's *De anima* has to integrate the Arabic set of arguments for immateriality within a broader commentatorial discourse on the Aristotelian notion of intellect. Albert's rationale for inserting the proofs at this specific point in the text – in the middle of the commentary on Aristotle, *De anima* III 4, after 429^a18–23³⁸ and before 429^a24³⁹ – is given at the beginning of the *digressio* that constitutes chapter III.2.14: since all the opinions presented in the long doxographical series that precedes (in particular in the digressions that form chapters III.2.4 to III.2.11)⁴⁰ assume the separate and unmixed character of the possible intellect, Albert muses, it will

spectively from Constabulus' (Qusṭā ibn Lūqā's) *De differentia spiritus et animae* (2), Iohannitius' (Hunayn ibn Ishāq's) *Isagoge* (3), and Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Λ (4). See ALBERTUS MAGNUS 2008, 463.14–36.

37 The *solutio*, with Albert's answers to the objections, is in ALBERTUS MAGNUS 2008, 463.37–464.6. Compare in particular ALBERTUS MAGNUS 2008, 463.40–41: “cum multum occupatur circa unum quod retrahitur ab alio” and Algazel, *STP*, ed. MUCKLE 1933, 177.4–5 = ST. CLAIR 2005, 77.416–417: “Cum igitur occupatur circa unum, retrahitur ab alio.”

38 In *De anima* III.2.2, ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1968, 178–179.

39 In *De anima* III.2.15, ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1968, 198–199.

40 The chapters in question present, in this order, the opinions on the intellect of: Alexander of Aphrodisias (III.2.4), Theophrastus and Themistius (III.2.5), Abubacher and Avempace (who in reality coincide with only one thinker, Abū Bakr Ibn Bāġġa, III.2.6), Averroes (III.2.7), some “followers of Anaxagoras” (“nonnulli Anaxagoram sequentes”), but really Avicenna and al-Ġazālī (III.2.8), Avicbron (Solomon Ibn Gabirol, III.2.9), Plato and Gregorius of Nissa (actually Nemesius of Emesa, III.2.10), and some unspecified contemporary Latin authors (III.2.11).

be worthwhile presenting, albeit briefly (*breviter*),⁴¹ the ten proofs on the topic given by the Peripatetics, and especially (*et praecipue*) those advanced by Avicenna in his *De anima*.⁴² Interestingly, in *De anima* III.2.14 Albert insists on the fact that these proofs are sustained in part by what he has already said before (*ex iam habitis*, 179.79), and in part by what will follow (*ex habendis*, 179.80). This insistence can be easily explained by reading the passage of the Aristoteles Latinus that Albert paraphrases in the chapter of *De anima* immediately following our digression, *i.e.*, III.2.15. The excerpt corresponds to Aristotle, *De anima* III 4, 429^a31–429^b5, in the Greek-into-Latin translation by James of Venice:

Sensus enim non potest sentire ex valde sensibili, ut sonus ex magnis sonis, neque ex fortibus coloribus et odoribus neque videre neque odorare; sed intellectus, cum aliquid intelligat valde intelligibile, non minus intelligit infima sed et magis. Sentitivum quidem enim non sine corpore est, hic autem separatus est.⁴³

Along with other Aristotelian texts from *De anima*, this passage has already been referenced in scholarship as the direct source of one particular Avicennan argument for immateriality, based on the intensity of perception.⁴⁴ The core idea of this proof is that, while corporeal faculties are harmed by too strong stimu-

41 ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1968, 179.72 and 179.80.

42 ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1968, 179.73–75: “ex quibus hoc probaverunt Peripatetici, et praecipue Avicenna in VI naturalium suorum.”

43 I quote the Latin text of James of Venice’s translation as available online in the Aristoteles Latinus Database (ALD), there described as the “textus editionis quae paratur a † Jos Decorte et Jozef Brams” and as “a foretaste of the critical edition that has been a desideratum for a long time” (now being prepared by P. Beullens). This text is a great improvement with respect to the one printed in the footer of the edition of Albert’s *De anima*, ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1968, 198 (italics have been added to mark especially relevant variant readings with respect to the ALD text): “Sensus enim non potest sentire (429^b) ex valde sensibili, ut *sensus* ex magnis sonis, neque ex fortibus *odoribus et coloribus* videre neque odorare, sed *cum intellectu* intelligat aliquid valde intelligibile, non minus intelligit infima, sed magis. *Sentitivum* enim non sine corpore est. Hic autem separatus.” Compare also the original Greek of Aristotle’s *De anima*: ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις οὐ δύναται αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα αἰσθητοῦ, οἶον ψόφου ἐκ τῶν μεγάλων ψόφων, οὐδ’ ἐκ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν χρωμάτων καὶ ὀσμῶν οὔτε ὄραν οὔτε ὀσμάσθαι· ἀλλ’ ὁ νοῦς ὅταν τι νοήσῃ σφόδρα νοητόν, οὐχ ἦττον νοεῖ τὰ ὑποδεέστερα, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος, ὁ δὲ χωριστός.

44 With regard to the parallel passage expounding the same idea in Avicenna’s *Adḥawīyya* (see *supra*, fn. 13), Lucchetta (IBN SINĀ 1969, 176 fn. 3) aptly referenced the source-texts of ARISTOTLE, *De anima* II 12, 424^a28–30; III 2, 426^a30–426^b3; III 4, 429^a31–429^b4; III 13, 435^b7–9.

lations of their own object, which can make them incapable of pursuing their activity (eyes can be blinded by too bright a flash, ears deafened by too thunderous a sound, etc.), the acquisition of something “intensely intelligible” (*valde intelligibile*) makes it on the contrary much easier for the intellect to acquire simpler notions at a second time. The fact that, immediately after the presentation of the set of proofs that includes this one, Albert proceeds to comment on Aristotle’s direct source-text for this proof (and probably also the inspiration for the others ‘organic’ proofs devised by Avicenna) clearly justifies his didactic care in presenting these Peripatetic arguments – although coming from the tradition of Arabs – as structurally coherent with the general configuration of Aristotle’s own text. The balance of chapters of paraphrase and chapters of digression is thus reached also through the accurate usage of cross-references (compare the formulas *ex iam habitis / ex habendis*), which help bridging the historical and doctrinal supplements provided by Albert (*digressionones*) with his core activity of commenting on Aristotle (paraphrases).

(3) Coming to *De natura et origine animae* II.2 (which is to be seen in connection with the following chapter, II.3, for certain objections), the context of Albert’s incorporation of the Arabic proofs changes once more. Overall, Albert’s treatise on the nature and the origin of the soul displays the least allegiance to the Ġazālīan source of all the works we are considering. First, it is the only one of the four texts in which the proofs are not explicitly numbered.⁴⁵ Moreover, there are sensible differences with respect to al-Ġazālī’s text in the formulation and ordering of the arguments.⁴⁶ Finally, a specific emphasis is given to a notion which does not appear elsewhere in the parallel texts on the immateriality of the rational soul, namely, that of bodily and complexional harmony (*harmonia*).

From the very beginning of the chapter, Albert frames the issue of the separation of the rational soul in terms of both an ontological and operational independence from the “harmony” of the organic body.⁴⁷ The same notion is later put to use in the concrete explanation of some of the Arabic proofs. For example, the third “sign” of the *separatio* of the rational soul given by Albert argues that

45 See *supra*, Table 1, row *Numbering*.

46 For an aperçu of these differences see *supra*, Table 2.

47 ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1955, 20.32–35: “[...] anima rationalis non est virtus in corpore, ita quod secundum esse vel operationem vel utrumque ad corporis harmoniam dependeat.”

there is no physical organ whose “harmony and mixture” (*harmonia et commixtio*) are well proportioned to all beings, either corporeal or incorporeal; but intellect knows both genera of beings, therefore it cannot have a physical organ.⁴⁸ Further, the harmony of the organ is evoked once more, in the fourth sign, as the quality which is damaged by an exceptionally strong perceivable object (*ab excellenti*), in an iteration of the argument on intense perception, taken ultimately from Aristotle’s *De anima*, which we have discussed in what precedes.⁴⁹ While the term *harmonia* is used quite often in the Greek-into-Latin translation of Aristotle’s *De anima* made by James of Venice, especially in chapters I.3 and I.4,⁵⁰ and as such it also appears abundantly in Albert’s own commentary on the work,⁵¹ its specific physiological meaning of ‘complexion’ appears distinct from those occurrences.

A perfectly parallel passage to the one from *De natura et origine anime* we have just mentioned occurs, for instance, in the *Quaestio de prophetia*, in which Albert similarly associates the notions of harmony (*harmonia*), intensity of perception (*excellencia*), and the corporeal nature of whatever is affected positively by the former and negatively by the latter.⁵² Further parallels can be elicited by

48 ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1955, 20.54–58: “Adhuc autem, quia nullum est instrumentum, cuius harmonia et commixtio proportionalis sit omnibus corporalibus et incorporalibus, intellectus autem est omnia fieri, non igitur est in aliquo corporeo instrumento, sed separatus ab omnibus.”

49 ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1955, 20.32–35: “Adhuc autem, quia omne operans in organo laeditur ab excellenti harmoniam organi sui, sicut visus a claritate solis, intellectus autem a maxime intelligibilibus non laeditur, sed confortatur [...]” While some manuscripts read *harmonia* (in the ablative, to be connected with the preceding *ab excellenti*), the accusative *harmoniam* can be taken as an accusative of relation, which restricts the domain of the harm provoked by the intense perceivable (*ab excellenti*) to the “harmony” or complexion of the organ itself. The reading with the ablative, although *prima facie* smoother, would entail that the excellent complexion of the organ damages the organ itself, which is an unacceptable meaning.

50 I have verified this with the search tool of the Aristoteles Latinus Database, with a ‘fuzzy’ search for *harmonia*.

51 See e.g. chapter I.2.8, titled *De improbatione opinionis, quae dixit animam esse harmoniam corporis commixti*, in Albert the Great, *De anima*, ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1968, 38–41, which comments on Aristotle, *De anima* I 4, 407^b27 ff. (with many occurrences of *harmonia* and its cognates).

52 ALBERT, *Quaestio de prophetia*, 2.4.1.1, in ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1993(1), 65.37–41 (see also ALBERTUS MAGNUS 2009, 68–71, for the Latin text with a facing Italian translation): “Item, quidquid delectatur in harmonia eius quod recipit, et tristatur in excellentia, est corpus et recipit formam corporis; tale quidem est oculus; ergo sicut oculus est corpus, ita id quod aget in ipsum, corpus erit.” The same passage is also reported in the *Quaestio de prophetia*

some psycho-physiological discussions by Albert, for instance in *De homine*⁵³ and *De iuventute et senectute*.⁵⁴

(4) In the fifth *membrum* of *Summa theologiae* II.13.77, the ten ‘Peripatetic’ proofs are given by Albert – if he is indeed the author of the text – as the sixth *ratio* in favour of the separability of the soul from the body, and they are presented under the name of Avicenna alone (al-Ġazālī is not mentioned). This omission aligns the text of the *Summa* with that of Albert’s *De anima*, in which the proofs are similarly ascribed to the sole Avicenna, despite being taken almost *verbatim* from Algazel.⁵⁵ Table 2, above, shows the high degree of similarity between the lists of proofs of *De anima* and the *Pars secunda* of the *Summa theologiae*. In particular, the two Albertinian texts have in common the usage of Algazel’s ‘added’ argument (the eleventh in the series, concerning the infinity of intellect’s potential objects) as their tenth proof, while *De natura et origine animae* does not seem to rehearse this proof directly, and *De homine* only has something similar much earlier in the list (at proof 4).

Despite these similarities, a conspicuous difference stands out, which separates the text of the *Summa theologiae* not only from *De anima*, but also from the other two texts by Albert that we have been considering. This is the absence in the list of a proof based on animals’ and humans’ shared brain anatomy, which is on the contrary reported by Albert in all other works in which he treats the Avicennan/Ġazālīan arguments.⁵⁶ This particular proof argues for the immateriality of intellect on the grounds that a specific cerebral localisation for it cannot possibly be found: indeed, some (superior) animals share with human beings

II (ab alio redacta, incompleta), for which see ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1993(1), 80.66–70 (the sole variant being *agit* for *aget*).

53 See, e.g., *De homine*, ALBERTUS MAGNUS 2008, 258.4–9: “Quando enim potentia animae coniungitur cum organo, est potentia prima ad sensum; quando vero dispositio fit per spiritum animale et calorem naturalem et harmoniam organi, tunc est potentia sensus in secundo gradu; quando vero habet speciem sensibilis, tunc est potentia completa per actum.” Against the *sententia de harmonia* (which, according to Albert, has been touched upon and already criticised by Aristotle in the first book of his *De anima*) see also the intricate discussion of *De homine*, ALBERTUS MAGNUS 2008, 46.36–48.29.

54 ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1890, 314b: “[...] et tunc sunt deliri, eo quod distemperata est harmonia virtutum animalium eorum, sicut lyra dissona.”

55 See *supra*, 67–68, for a brief discussion of the “immo: Algazel” typology of quotations of Avicenna on the part of Albert.

56 See *supra*, 74.

all the cavities of the brain in which the internal senses are located, and yet they do not possess any intellectual capacity.⁵⁷ The proof, in this particular form, is absent in both Avicenna's *De anima* V.2 and in the psychology of Algazel's *STP*, and it appears therefore to be a most likely addition by Albert himself.

However, the spirit of the argument is unmistakably Avicennan/Ġazālīan, in so far as the proof fits perfectly into its immediate context – the series of the seven 'organic' signs distinguished by Algazel – and it is based, moreover, on recognisably Avicennan teachings concerning the anatomy of the brain and the localisation of psycho-physiological functions.⁵⁸ Beside Avicenna's teachings on the ventricular localisation of the inner senses, the closest source of inspiration for this proof can probably be found in a passage of Algazel's *STP* shortly preceding the series of ten arguments, in which al-Ġazālī stresses the singular possession (*proprietas*) of the intellect (glossed as the faculty specifically devoted to the knowledge of universals) on the part of humankind, as opposed to all other animal species.⁵⁹

57 The argument is given in very similar form in *De homine*, ALBERTUS MAGNUS 2008, 462.16–23; *De anima*, ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1968, 197.39–46; *De natura et origine animae*, ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1955, 20.79–81.

58 The editors of ALBERTUS MAGNUS 2008, 462.16–21, *ad loc.*, reference the corresponding item in al-Ġazālī's list (the sixth proof, in MUCKLE 1933, 176.16–19), which is however a different kind of argument. Moreover, the *apparatus fontium* states a correspondence with Avicenna's *De anima* I.5 (see IBN SĪNĀ 1972, 87.19–90.6), which is a presentation of the internal faculties of the soul. This passage could be usefully complemented by the further discussion of chapter IV.1 of Avicenna's *De anima* (IBN SĪNĀ 1968, 1–11, esp. 8.2–11.43), although in both cases Albert's specific argument transcends the source, as it uses contextually the anatomic similarity of humans and animals to justify the impossibility for the intellect to have a corporeal seat (while Avicenna's texts merely present that shared anatomy, by the way with no particular emphasis on the fact that it is shared by human and non-human animals). Further, the editors of ALBERTUS MAGNUS 2008, *ibid.* reference Albert's own *De anima* on the inner senses (ALBERTUS MAGNUS 1968, 158.4–33: *Et est digressio declarans quinque vires animae sensibilis interiores*) and a preceding passage of *De homine* itself (ALBERTUS MAGNUS 2008, 305.25 ff.), which consists in a series of specific references to the ventricular localisation of the inner senses (although the section is explicitly titled after the organic seat of memory alone: *De organo memoriae*). It is particularly relevant that Albert there writes: "et hoc est secundum ordinem divisionem capitis in brutis" (ALBERTUS MAGNUS 2008, 305.32–33), because this effectively highlights that animals share these brain features with human beings.

59 ALGAZEL, *STP, Physica* IV.3, MUCKLE 1933, 174.26–27; 31–33; ST. CLAIR 2005, 74.345; 74.349–75.350: "non est autem haec virtus in ceteris animalibus [...] proprietas hominis in qua non communicant ei alia animalia est intellectus, et credulitas de universalibus."

The *Summa theologiae*, therefore, omits a specific proof for the immateriality of intellect, which, although seamlessly integrated into the series of Algazel's arguments reported by Albert, is in fact a plausible supplement added by Albert himself to the standard set of proofs he had found, ready-made, in the *STP*. The fact that Albert certainly resorted to the same argument from the early *De homine* (1242) up to the more mature *De anima* and *De natura et origine animae* (1254–7 and after this date) allows one to surmise that he did not change his mind about the appropriateness of this specific 'anatomical' proof for his discourse on the incorporeality of the rational soul.

Thus, its absence in the second part of the *Summa theologiae* might be seen as a hint that the work is not authentically by Albert, at least in that portion of the text. As a matter of fact, it seems easier to surmise that someone else among Albert's pupils (who might have compiled the *Summa*) decided to eliminate this specific proof, rather than assuming that the elderly Albert explicitly chose to remove an argument that he himself had most likely invented, and that he had consistently repeated in three different works in his earlier career. While the poor status of the available editions for the *Pars secunda* of the *Summa theologiae* invites the utmost caution with respect to any definitive conclusion, it is important to stress that the comparative study of reused source-materials throughout Albert's production could help us shedding new light also on works of dubious attribution such as the late *Summa*.

A further, particularly intriguing consequence of Albert's repeated reliance on the set of proofs studied in this contribution is the possibility of shedding new light on Albert's scholarly methods, which seem to have entailed – at least occasionally – the usage of paper slips or record cards (*cedulae?*),⁶⁰ which gathered already well-arranged notes on a given topic and which could be selected and reused at will and *en bloc*, whenever their content was needed. In this direction, the iterated quotation of specific Arabic authors and doctrines across Albert's differentiated writings can be seen as a particularly treasurable test

60 The usage of *cedulae* is attested *e.g.* for the drafting of the Parisian condemnation of 1277 on the part of Bishop Tempier, although scholars disagree on whether the *cedulae* were simply juxtaposed to form the *rotulus* of the condemnation or rather rearranged according to a designed structure. For a recent synthesis, with abundant reference to prior scholarship, see PALAZZO 2018, 171–172.

bed to refine our understanding of the methods of his scholarly work as well as, more generally, of the trajectory of his intellectual evolution.

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