

## ABSTRACTS

**Fiorella Retucci, «Magister Thomas Anglicus Minor». Tommaso di York fonte dell'Expositio di Bertoldo di Moosburg, pp. 1-41**

Berthold of Moosburg had the whole *Sapientiale* by Thomas of York constantly at hand when writing his commentary on Proclus. Even though Berthold never refers by name to the English Franciscan except in his *tabula auctoritatum*, where Thomas is registered as «Magister Thomas Anglicus minor», he quotes extensively and verbatim from the *Sapientiale* throughout his *Expositio* of Proclus; astoundingly, Berthold quotes more from Thomas than he does from his Dominican predecessors in the Teutonic Province, Albert the Great, Ulrich of Strassburg and Dietrich of Freiberg. The following article describes the presence of Thomas of York in Berthold of Moosburg's *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam*. An appendix provides a systematic investigation of the relationship between the texts of the two authors.

**Keywords:** Berthold of Moosburg; *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam*; Thomas of York; *Sapientiale*.

**Stefan Kirschner, Albertino Rinaldi da Salso on the Motion of Elements and Mixed Bodies in a Void, pp. 42-70**

In his *questio* on the motion of elements and mixed bodies in a void the Italian

professor of practical medicine, Albertino Rinaldi da Salso di Piacenza (Albertinus de Rainaldis de Placentia, also known as Albertino da Piacenza), held the clearly non-Aristotelian view that an element in a void would not move instantaneously, but successively. To prove his conclusion Albertino draws to a large degree on arguments proposed by Richard Kilvington. Among the few 14th century authors who rejected Aristotle's account of motion in a vacuum Kilvington had presented the most thorough analysis of this subject. While Kilvington is known for his sophisticated argumentation and entangled style of presenting and sometimes nearly hiding his own opinions, Albertino's treatise is better structured, and his conclusions are brought out more clearly. His disputation is an impressive testimony to the impact of Kilvington's views of motion in a void.

**Keywords:** Albertino Rinaldi da Salso; Richard Kilvington; vacuum; void; motion in a void.

**Roberto Pinzani, *Some Notes on Predication*, pp. 71-82**

In the *Categories* Aristotle defines the analytic relationship of 'being said' in terms of ordinary categorical predication. The interpreters found themselves facing different interpretative problems, among others the meaning of categorical terms, how to understand the predication relation or the predication relations, what properties these relations have, etc. In the present brief contribution I consider two questions concerning transitivity and the metaphysical meaning of Aristotelian definitions.

**Keywords:** Aristotle; Categories; 'being said'; predication; transitivity.

**Franco De Capitani, *L'orizzonte 'sensibile' del pensiero manicheo dell'Agostino ventisettenne e le fonti della sua informazione filosofica, secondo gli apporti della critica recente*, pp. 83–124**

The purpose of this essay is to highlight the internal logic of Augustine's thought as expressed in his *De pulchro et apto*, in order to provide a general interpretative key enabling the mapping of the various indications of sources, passages and concepts used by Augustine. Accordingly, this purpose is essentially twofold: (1) a logical and doctrinal exploration of Augustine's *De pulchro et apto* (which is not just a treatment of the problem of beauty in a Manichaean perspective, but an exposition of the whole philosophy of the young, Manichean Augustine, in metaphysics, ethics, physics, cosmology, aesthetics, psychology and theology), and (2) a bibliographical update concerning the contents of this work and its Manichean cultural and philosophical context.

**Keywords:** Augustine; *De pulchro et apto*; sources; Manicheism.

**Jean Celeyrette, *Une question de perspective disputée à Erfurt partiellement copiée sur une question d'Oresme*, pp. 125–179**

Here, we give the first edition of a question *De apprehensione rerum per visum* disputed at Erfurt, probably around 1350–1355. It has the same title as a question by Oresme, and we can observe that it often borrows to this last one. It is situated in the frame of the perspectivist studies in the new eastern European universities. Above all, it is a rare testimony of the Nicole Oresme's influence on the studies in these universities.

**Keywords:** Nicole Oresme; *De apprehensione rerum per visum*; *perspectiva*; Er-

furt.

**Loris Sturlese, *A proposito dell'attribuzione a Eckhart delle Collationes tramandate dal codice Cusano 21*, pp. 180–198**

This paper examines the attribution to Eckhart of the unpublished *collationes* contained in the MS Bernkastel-Kues, Bibliothek des St. Nikolaus-Hospitals 21. Eckhart's authorship was excluded by Koch, but is plausible from the point of view of the history of the manuscript tradition. The paper announces the discovery of a series of similar *collationes* in a Lüneburg manuscript of Franciscan origin and highlights, through the edition of the texts relating to Advent, some parallels between both works, probably depending on the use of a common source.

**Keywords:** Eckhart; MS Cusanus 21; *collationes*.

**Aurélien Robert, *Désir de persévérer dans l'être et mort volontaire chez Nicole Oresme*, pp. 199–239**

In his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, Nicole Oresme raises a question that he is apparently the first to ask in these terms, in such a context: do all beings have the desire to persevere into being? Before him, this question is not found in any of the medieval commentaries on Aristotle's *Physics*. But after him it became canonical until at least the 16th century, since it can be found in Pietro Pomponazzi's works for example. The novelty here consists in questioning the validity of Averroes' thesis, in his own commentary on the *Physics*, according to which all beings have the desire to persist into being, using the Augustinian analysis of voluntary death and suicide. How can we ex-

plain that one can freely put an end to his days if he is naturally inclined by a desire for life and even for eternity? Oresme's solution consists in justifying not only the possibility, but also the moral obligation to accept death under certain conditions. In most cases, we do not really want to die. The desperate man wishes to cancel his misfortune and the heroic man who sacrifices himself for his country wishes to immortalize himself in the memory of other men. From a moral point of view, Nicole Oresme justifies only one case of voluntary death: that of individual sacrifice for the common good. The aim of this paper is to analyze precisely this important turning point in the long history of the notion of *conatus* in the West by comparing this *quaestio* from the commentary on the *Physics* with the glosses that accompany the French translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* realised by Oresme at the court of Charles V.

**Keywords:** Nicole Oresme; *Physics*; Pietro Pomponazzi; death; suicide; being.

**Onorato Grassi, *La critica di Robert Holcot alla causalità*, pp. 240–262**

Robert Holcot discusses the principle of causality in q. 3 of *Determinationes*, a text also preserved in q. 53 (ms. Cambridge, Pembroke College, 236) and q. 58 (ms. Oxford, Balliol College, 246) of *Quodlibet* I. In this text, Holcot maintains that the relation of causality is not evident. He gives two reasons: first, he calls into question the distinction between cause and effect – since the effect is not encompassed in the cause, it cannot necessarily follow from the cause – and second, he invokes the possibility that God has to produce an effect entirely independent of any natural cause. The solution envisaged by Holcot understands the knowledge of causality as a case of probable knowledge (*probabiliter*). The relation of causality stems from observing the repetition of

the relations between two *res*, so that when a *res* is present one can expect another to be present. The present article has two appendices: the first contains the version of the text conserved in mss Pembroke and Balliol, the second instead contains the version conserved in the ms. Düsseldorf, Universitäts-und Landesbibliothek, ms. F. 5 and in some early-modern printed editions.

**Keywords:** Robert Holcot; *Determinationes*; causality; God; probable knowledge.

**Gian Pietro Soliani, *Essere è volere. Il problema dell'onnipotenza in Duns Scoto*, pp. 263–358**

The aim of this article is to examine Duns Scotus' account of divine omnipotence. I shall firstly consider his doctrine of the objective possible and the distinction between logical potency and metaphysical potency. Secondly, by drawing on Scotus' main texts on divine omnipotence (especially the *Quodlibet VII*), I will argue that, in his view, God's omnipotence is not demonstrable, but at the same time is not an irrational concept, as Aristotle and many Medieval *philosophi* claimed. Finally, I shall discuss the connection between Scotus' theory of being and that of the superiority of the will over the intellect.

**Keywords:** Duns Scotus; *Quodlibet*; omnipotence; being; will.

**Marco Bertozzi, *Gli ultimi (e avvelenati) giorni della breve e luminosa vita di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: un "giallo" rinascimentale*, pp. 359–371**

Giovanni Pico della Mirandola was (probably) poisoned by his secretary,

Cristoforo da Casalmaggiore, as Marin Sanudo testifies in his *Diarii*. After Pico's remains exhumation, some years ago, it was also supposed that the main responsible of the poisoning was Marsilio Ficino. The purpose of this paper is to trace the 'romance' sources of this strange supposition.

**Keywords:** Giovanni Pico della Mirandola; Cristoforo da Casalmaggiore; Marsilio Ficino; Renaissance; Platonic philosophy.

**Silvana Vecchio, Peccatum pessimum. L'ira nella Moralis philosophia di Ruggero Bacono, pp. 372-394**

The analysis of the moral doctrines contained in the *Moralis philosophia* of Roger Bacon reveals the central place reserved to the vice of anger. Bacon considers it a very serious sin, which goes against the human nature and makes many devastating effects on individuals and their social relations. Bacon's moral doctrines are based on a source that has been recently rediscovered, Seneca's *De ira*. Bacon is one of the first authors to quote extensively that work. Bacon's enthusiasm for the Latin philosopher is the result of his conviction of the superiority of pagan philosophers over the Christians, especially in the field of ethics. The knowledge of the ancients, which is necessary for the life of individuals and for the proper function of institutions, is a duty for Christian thinkers.

**Keywords:** Roger Bacon; *Moralis philosophia*; anger; Seneca; Pagan philosophers.

**Fabio Zanin, *Le radici logiche e metafisiche della filosofia naturale parigina: volontà e ordine della natura nel pensiero di Buridano*, pp. 395–432**

Till just few decades ago, scholars used to use the label ‘Ockhamism’ to mark a turning-point in the history of mediaeval philosophy, above all in the history of natural philosophy. That turning-point was exemplified by the once so-called ‘Buridanian school’, today known simply as ‘Parisian school of natural philosophy’, whose leading representative was for sure John Buridan. But looking carefully at some crucial points of the Picard master’s idea of ‘nature’, concerning specifically the relationship between God and secondary causes on one side, and the role played by free will, both the divine and the human one, on the other side, one will find out that Buridan’s ‘Ockhamism’ is at least questionable: Scotus’ modal logic is the conceptual framework, within which he redetermines the boundaries of natural laws, but the ‘pure ockhamist’ idea of the prevalence of the will on the intellect in God’s nature is the source of an image of the world in which voluntary behaviours and natural laws are intertwined. Therefore, Buridan’s natural philosophy results as a peculiar synthesis of two of the main divergent lines of thinking of late mediaeval philosophy.

**Keywords:** modal logic; possible world; free will; natural law; secondary causes.

**Jack Zupko, *Nicole Oresme, Dualist*, pp. 433–465**

According to Nicole Oresme (c. 1320-1382), human beings, unlike all other animals, consist of two substances: a thinking substance and a sensing substance. This paper presents and explores the arguments Oresme uses to arrive

at this position, which is unusual in medieval philosophical psychology and which at least superficially -- though their methods are completely different -- resembles what Descartes concluded about the nature of the human soul and body two and a half centuries later. The paper also considers some moments of ambivalence in Oresme's presentation, as well as unresolved difficulties, several of which have theological as well as philosophical implications.

**Keywords:** dualism; hylomorphism; substance; soul/body; form/matter; inherence; extension; intellect; sensation; human nature; Aristotelian psychology; Oresme; Buridan.

**Simone Fellina, *Platone a Ferrara: il De providentia ad sententiam Platonis et Platoniorum liber unus* di Tommaso Giannini, pp. 466-553**

Tommaso Giannini (1556-1638) was a prominent professor at the Ferrara *Studium* between the sixteenth and the seventeenth century. Probably influenced by Platonic sympathies nurtured by the Court and partly by the University milieu, in 1587 he published his first work titled *De providentia ad sententiam Platonis et Platoniorum liber unus*, which was a catalyst for his academic career. His *De providentia* displays a large amount of sources always tacitly used: Marsilio Ficino, Jacques Charpentier, Giulio Serina, Stefano Tiepolo, Teofilo Zimara, Bessarion, Agostino Steuco, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and amid the ancients Plotinus, Plutarch, Sirianus, Proclus (read through Teofilo Zimara and Leonico Tomeo), Iamblichus, Apuleius, Calcidius, Ammonius, Psellus. Though a compilative work, the *De providentia* retains nonetheless a great importance insofar as it contributes to focus the *bibliotheca platonica* of the time, furthermore in the same years and place of Francesco Pat-

rizi da Cherso's teaching.

**Keywords:** Renaissance Platonism; sources; providence; One, Intellect, World Soul; demonology; astrology; human souls; metempsychosis.

**Alessandra Beccarisi, *Qualche considerazione sulla Geomantia attribuita a Guglielmo di Moerbeke*, pp. 554–603**

This article presents a few research findings related to the *Geomantia* attributed to William of Moerbeke. It consists of three sections: The first provides evidence for the classification of the *Geomantia* within the genre of the medieval compilations. The second includes a comparison of the *Geomantia* with the *Ars geomantie nova* of Bartholomew of Parma and a few considerations on the datation of the treatise attributed to Moerbeke, based on this assessment. The third brings to the attention of scholars an unpublished marginal note concerning the date of composition of the *Geomantia*.

**Keywords:** Medieval Geomancy; Guillelmus de Moerbeke; Bartholomaeus Parmensis; Witelo; *Perspectiva*.

**Guido Alliney, *Quando Duns Scotus ha cambiato idea sulla volontà? La causa del volere secondo la quaestio 6 delle Collationes parisienses*, pp. 604–640**

The paper deals with the question of the development of Duns Scotus' thought on the causes of the will: is the intellect a contributory cause of the choice (as claimed in the writings of the Oxford period), or is it only an occasion for it (as stated in the last works, written in Paris)? The *collatio* 6, prob-

ably discussed in 1301, immediately after the arrival of the Scottish theologian in Paris, still defends the doctrine of the intellect as a contributory cause of the will, and therefore represents the last text preceding the turn of Scotus towards the theory that assigns to the intellect the role of mere *causa sine qua non*. This theory was widespread in Paris and supported by the Master of Scotus, Gonsalvus of Spain, who probably heavily influenced the doctrinal change of Scotus.

**Keywords:** Duns Scotus; Gonsalvus of Spain; *Collationes parisienses*; will; causality.

**Franco Bacchelli, *Un appello al sultano Bayezid II di un latino convertito all'Islam ed uno "Psefisma" di Isidoro di Kiev per la concordia universale*, pp. 641–656**

This paper contains the first edition of a Latin poem preserved in cod. Barb. gr. 127, written by a Latin converted to Islam who urges the Sultan Bayezid II to come in Italy and to establish in Rome a "Universal Monarchy". In the appendix it is provided the Italian translation of an utopian text by Isidor of Kiev, dealing with a future general gathering of the Hellenes to promote a more general council composed by wise men coming from all lands, with the purpose to reach a philosophical and religious *concordia*.

**Keywords:** Isidor of Kiev; Bayezid II; universal monarchy; *concordia*.

**Vittoria Perrone Compagni, *Il nido della rondine. Due lezioni di Pomponazzi su Phys. II, t. 80*, pp. 657–721**

This paper focuses on two short *dubitationes* on animal's technical abilities,

which Pietro Pomponazzi discussed in 1514 and in 1519 while teaching at the University of Bologna and commenting on Aristotle's *Physica*, II, t. 80. A comparative analysis between the respective positions, expressed at a distance of five years, allows to retrace the change in Pomponazzi's thoughts from the period immediately preceding the composition of *De immortalitate animae* to the writing of the *De incantationibus* and *De fato*.

**Keywords:** animals; teleology; natural instinct; astrology; *virtus aestimativa*; prophecy; determinism.

**Pietro B. Rossi, *A lezione dall'Argiropulo. Gli appunti di Bartolomeo Fonzio sui Secondi analitici*, pp. 722-775**

In their pioneering, masterly research and survey on Bartolomeo Fonzio's manuscripts, published in 1974, Stefano Caroti and Stefano Zamponi informed the reader that the Ms. Ricc. 152 of the Riccardiana Library in Florence was a huge amount of notebooks with notes taken by Fonzio while attending the *Studium* in Florence. Among them Caroti and Zamponi called the reader's attention to the notes Fonzio took when he went to Argyropoulos' lessons on the *Posterior Analytics*. In this essay the reader finds a transcription of those notes, preceded by some comments on the sources from which the outstanding commentator is likely to have drawn and which can be picked out from the fragmentary notes, that is John Philoponus and Paul of Venice.

**Keywords:** Aristotle; *Posterior Analytics*; John Argyropoulos; Bartolomeo Fonzio; Paul of Venice.

**Christophe Grellard, *Nominalisme et démonologie. L'imputabilité des croyances et le problème de l'hétérodoxie chez Guillaume de Manderston*, pp. 776–811**

In his *Bipartitum in morali philosophia*, the Scottish philosopher William of Manderston, a pupil of John Mair, and an ockhamist philosopher, is quoting a text of Antonin of Padova who distinguishes the factum opened to a juridical qualification from the inner belief, known by God alone. Quoting the same text, the authors of the *Malleus maleficarum* try hard to distinguish three distinct fields, the inner beliefs which belongs to God, the exterior acts, the facts, which are relevant for the judges, and the third field, which establishes a relation between the fact and the beliefs. This third field is proper to the inquisitors. Against this ethics of imputability, Manderston, relying on Ockham's ethics, advocates an intentionalist ethics which depends on a sharp separation between interiority and exteriority. The soteriological dimension of the question entirely belongs to the inner life, whereas the exteriority is strictly disciplinary. By his radicality, Manderston appears as a paradigm of the modern dichotomy between conscience and law, Paolo Prodi once pointed out as a cornerstone of the religious modernity.

**Keywords:** intention; belief; imputability; heresy; will; interiority.

**Fabrizio Amerini, *Guglielmo di Ockham, l'onnipotenza divina e l'intuizione del non-esistente*, pp. 812–877**

In this essay, we reconsider two themes particularly discussed by the interpreters of Ockham: that of divine omnipotence and the hypothesis of the intuitive cognition of non-existent things. The purpose is to show that the hy-

pothetical case considered by Ockham was subjected to opposite interpretations. For theological reasons, Ockham attributes not only to God but also to human beings the possibility of having acts of intuitive cognition of things that do not exist; nonetheless, he holds that it is contradictory for God to give us the evident cognition of things that appear to be present when they are actually absent. Walter Chatton opposes this conclusion, arguing that no contradiction ensues from that hypothesis. Instead, he believes that it is impossible for God to give us the intuition of things that absolutely do not exist or are in no way present to us. Ockham's arguments include some difficulties that Chatton acutely sees and discusses. In particular, Chatton calls into question Ockham's missed distinction between the existence and the presence of the intuited thing.

**Keywords:** William of Ockham; Walter Chatton; God; omnipotence; intuition; existence.

**Iolanda Ventura - Marco Forlivesi, *L'immagine della medicina nelle lezioni inaugurali padovane: a margine del progetto DArIL*, pp. 878-940**

Starting from texts and data collected during the installation of the online database DArIL (Digital Archive of Inaugural Lectures at Renaissance and Early Modern Universities), the paper presents some results of this work. It is divided in two sections: in the first one, Marco Forlivesi describes DArIL, its structure, content, aims, and potential. In the second part, Iolanda Ventura attempts to distinguish the various types of *lectiones inaugurales* by focusing on specific texts dealing with medicine produced at the Universities of Padua, Jena, and Helmstedt during the Eighteenth Century.

**Keywords:** History of the university; DArIL; inaugural lectures (*lectiones inaugurales*); Padua; Jena; Helmstedt; History of medicine.

**Cristiano Casalini, *On Doctrine and Discipline: The Conimbricenses on the Beginning of Posterior Analytics*, pp. 941–973**

The issue on whether knowledge can be possibly transmitted and in which order from the teacher to his students has been a hot topic since ancient Greece. Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, just to mention two of the most famous philosophical “couples” apparently dissented from each other on this point. In this paper, I analyze the Conimbricenses’ thought on this topic by interpreting their commentary to the first lines of the *Posterior Analytics*. Assessing the Conimbricenses’ thought on this topic provide further insights on the general attitude of Jesuit philosophers toward their philosophical binding authorities, namely Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas.

**Keywords:** Conimbricenses; Jesuits; *Posterior Analytics*; knowledge; teaching.

**Dino Buzzetti, *Parafrasando Vignaux. Il posto della logica nella storia del pensiero medievale*, pp. 974–1044**

A sound historiographical account of the role of logic in the development of medieval philosophical and theological reflection requires a thorough examination of its historical roots and its theoretical implications. An apparent historiographical bias, due to the idea that only the development of contemporary formal logic enables a proper reconstruction of the whole history of logic, can be exposed by taking into account the case of the medieval discussions on the topics, starting from their late-antiquity legacy. An attentive inspection of

the successive stages of the gradual formalisation process of medieval topical logic brings to the fore significant theoretical aspects in the philosophy of logic, all too often left aside in common contemporary discussions. In particular, the distinction between topical maxims and topical differences, or principles *according to* and principles *from* which an inference is drawn, highlights the specific nature of a major part of medieval logic, that deals with meta-logical issues by means of higher-order logical resources. It is precisely this special character of medieval logic that proves to be of the highest significance in the discussion of the most subtle theological – and just as well philosophical – questions that engaged medieval authors, thus testifying to the essential role of logic in the overall development of medieval thought.

**Keywords:** logic; medieval philosophy; meta-logic.

**Irene Binini, *Riflessioni sul concetto di necessità nella prima metà del XII secolo*, pp. 1045–1088**

In this essay, I consider some logical treatises and commentaries from the first decades of the 12<sup>th</sup> century (many of which are still unedited) which contain a discussion on modalities and modal logic. After presenting a short catalogue of these sources and a description of their common features, I shall focus on some definitions of the modal term “*necessarium*” which are provided in them. As we will see, Abelard and logicians of his time advanced three different characterizations of this term: necessity was either defined in terms of *unavoidability* (*inevitabilitas*), or in terms of immutability and omnitemporality (*immutabilitas, sempiternitas*), or again in terms of *absolute* necessity as opposed to *conditioned* one (*necessitas absoluta vs. determinata*). I argue that the

temporal understanding of necessity in terms of omnitemporality, inherited from ancient sources and extensively used by Abelard and others in the first years of the twelfth-century, started to disappear in texts datable from around the 1120, perhaps due to several difficulties that were related to this definition when applied in logical contexts. I also discuss how the notion of *necessitas determinata* was used by Abelard's contemporaries to qualify the modal status of present and past events, which were generally believed to be necessary only in a "weak" and harmless sense that did not prevent them from being contingent.

**Keywords:** Peter Abelard; twelfth-century logic; medieval theories of modalities; necessity; absolute vs. conditioned necessity.

**Pasquale Porro, *Il filosofo, il poeta e l'arcivescovo. Qualche precisazione sulla fine di Sigieri di Brabante*, pp. 1089-1144**

By reconsidering all the available sources (from Simon du Val's inquisitorial summons of November 1276 to the *Continuatio brabantina*, from the Fiore to the X canto of Dante's *Paradiso*, from William of Tocco to Peckham's letters) the article calls into question the thesis – still widely shared – according to which Siger of Brabant died in Italy, and more precisely in Orvieto, at the Papal Court, before November 1284. Above all, from a doctrinal point of view, it shows how it is completely implausible that Peckham could refer to Siger of Brabant when, in his letter to the University of Oxford of November 10, 1284, he mentions two Seculars as the main defenders or 'inventors' of the thesis of the uniqueness of the substantial form in the human compound. The end of Siger in Italy could thus be, for the most part, a 'black legend', like that

of the poisoning of Thomas Aquinas on behalf of Charles of Anjou. The article closes by showing some possible implications, even of a methodological nature, of this different approach.

**Keywords:** Siger of Brabant; John Peckham; Dante Alighieri; *Il Fiore*; uniqueness of the substantial form; uniqueness of the possible intellect; Thomas Aquinas; Peter of John Olivi.