Gianni Vattimo fra realismo, metafisica e prassismo

Alcune considerazioni a partire dalla filosofia neoclassica di Gustavo Bontadini

Abstract

Vattimo’s thought has always declared its praxistic vocation. In this article, the gnoseological position that can be defined as ‘pure realism’ is first examined, understood as a rejection of naive or naturalistic realism. This type of realism, which has regained prominence and mobilized itself against Vattimo’s thought, can be refuted precisely to safeguard authentic realism. Moreover, once a gnoseology unaffected by naturalism is established, it remains open to metaphysics, as the doctrine of being. It is therefore argued that Vattimo, on the one hand, should have moved towards Gentile’s actual idealism, on the gnoseological front, and also on that of the philosophy of praxis. In conclusion, however, it is suggested that Vattimo’s anti-metaphysical stance does not grasp the structure of metaphysics as it can be configured in light of idealism, following the line of Bontadini and Severino, and that, on the contrary, this metaphysics upholds the ontological difference that Vattimo holds dear.